“Tren de Aragua Will Likely Survive Maduro’s Capture, Say Experts”
TdA’s name translates as the ‘train of Aragua’ and refers to a failed railway project funded by a large loan from China.
Just published this article about Tren de Aragua, and how it is unlikely to be derailed by the capture of Madurohttps://t.co/mLhbNcZOxB
— Total Crime (@totalcrime) January 12, 2026
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Original responses to Chris Summers’s questions:
How do you think the capture of Maduro will affect the Tren de Aragua cartel? How significant is it that in the indictment against Maduro one of his co-accused is one of the cartel’s founders, Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, aka “Niño Guerrero”?
It will be a blow, but a lot depends on how swiftly and deeply the United States acts to rebuild democratic governance. TdA is so dispersed and decentralized now—the horses have bolted—that reining it in will be incredibly difficult. That being said, not having a proactive state sponsor will reduce its competitive advantage in organized crime. The mention of Niño Guerrero points to the law-enforcement awareness that TdA is a monumental problem and a proxy paramilitary force serving both its own profitability and Chavista interests.
Q2: Do you think Tren de Aragua’s links to the regime in Caracas extend far deeper than Maduro? Will they continue to thrive until the PSUV itself is removed from power in Venezuela?
Yes. Nicolás Maduro is just one man and not a mastermind. He and his peers have shared in a useful crossover of profiteering and anti-imperialist, anti-US ideology. In particular, Diosdado Cabello appears to be one of the key figures who has partnered the Chavista regime with and cultivated the TdA organized crime network, but no doubt there are many others.
Similarly, until there is a profound overhaul—and even after that—TdA will continue to operate with at least some state collaboration. Infiltration and partnership with the Venezuelan exile community has demonstrated a willingness among a wide swath of Venezuelans to engage in crime, even when they have been victims of the socialist nightmare.
Q3: Last year the US government sanctioned another group, the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) which it said was headed by Maduro. What can you tell me about this organisation and how it relates to Tren de Aragua?
In my opinion, the Soles Cartel is a moniker referring to the graft network among top Chavista officials, especially in the military, and not so much of an on-the-ground cartel. In other words, Soles officials are profiting from the black market. They are partnering with, protecting, and permitting TdA and other cartels to conduct their activities while collecting a tax or payback on those activities. That makes the Soles members the political enablers and partners with organized crime stemming from Venezuelan and Colombian cartels, among others. I note the Colombians because so many hardened guerrillas and traffickers from Venezuela’s neighbor are now operating in and along the border with Venezuela.
Q4: How widely has the Tren de Aragua “virus” spread around Latin America? Is it true they have large cells embedded in migrant communities in Colombia, Peru and Chile?
Yes, although this can get confusing, because they have been known to use local names for their franchises. There have been major arrests in Colombia, Peru, and Chile. You can also add Ecuador to the list. Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa in 2025 classified TdA and other cartels as terrorists and arrested hundreds of cartel members, including some TdA members from Tocorón Prison. In Brazil, there appears to be more of an affiliate relationship with the firmly entrenched local organizations.
Q5: Mauricio Valdivia Devia, a lieutenant colonel in Chile’s carabinero police force, has reportedly said: “The capture of Maduro and the American pressure on Venezuela could lead to the expansion of Tren de Aragua southward. Chile must adopt special control measures, given that the most affected would be countries where they operate.” What do you make of his comments?
He is correct. TdA has shown a knack for splintering and reforming in a more dispersed and even more dangerous form. The most notable case was the takeover of Tocorón in 2023 by the Venezuelan military. On the surface, this appeared to be a crackdown. In fact, it was a catalyst for expansion beyond the prison epicenter.
Q6: How deeply embedded is Tren de Aragua in the United States? Will it be hard to remove them as a key player in organised crime in the US?
This is difficult to say because the presence is relatively new and evolving rapidly. There are reports floating around that there are cells in about half of the US states, and that would not surprise me. Removing them will be extremely difficult, and I have previously advocated drug liberalization and hefty punishment for participation. However, even that will not be enough. Beyond narcotics, TdA’s activities run the gamut, with particular expertise in human trafficking, extortion, and prostitution. Sophisticated organized crime should be an impetus for federal and state governments to raise their transparency and performance with regards to the rule of law.
Following the lines of gangs of Salvadoran exiles in the 1980s, there is now a critical mass of Venezuelans in the United States that are fodder for TdA recruitment. This means a long-term need for proactive measures and collaboration across borders. Pressure on the Colombian presidency, in particular, will be important. Gustavo Petro is at present protecting some of TdA’s most influential leaders. Larry Changa, for example, remains in a Bogotá prison and has not been extradited to Chile to face charges there.
