On July 30, 2025, the Honduran Public Prosecutor’s Office escalated an already fragile electoral crisis by accusing the National Electoral Council (CNE) of conspiracy and ordering its immediate examination by the Technical Criminal Investigation Agency (ATIC). The move, four months ahead of general elections scheduled for November 30, has shaken public confidence in the impartiality of the electoral process and the nation’s judicial independence.
The public prosecutor’s interference in the electoral process reflects the country’s slide into competitive authoritarianism. This model—becoming more common in Latin America and globally—uses elections to legitimize regimes rooted in censorship and control. It is a dangerous façade that threatens to permanently disfigure Honduran democracy.
The general elections will determine Honduras’s next president, 128 congressional representatives, 20 members of the Central American Parliament, and 298 municipal mayors. However, the electoral race remains clouded by uncertainty: three major polls show starkly conflicting results on which candidate is leading.
🇭🇳 #Honduras – Guerra de encuestas?
— DatoWorld (@DatosAme24) August 4, 2025
Pro Encuestas:
1️⃣🔵 Asfura – 37.3%
2️⃣🔴 Nasralla – 33.7%
3️⃣🟤 Rixi – 28.8%
Le Vote:
1️⃣🔴 Nasralla – 41%
2️⃣🔵 Asfura – 29%
3️⃣🟤 Rixi – 24%
Opinometro:
1️⃣🟤 Rixi – 33%
2️⃣🔴 Nasralla – 21.9%
3️⃣🔵 Asfura – 16.7%
The Conflict Has Not Ceased
The CNE board is composed of one representative from each major participating political party. Marlon Ochoa, one of the councilors, represents Libre, the ruling party of President Xiomara Castro. Cossette López and Ana Paola Hall represent the opposition National and Liberal parties.
The CNE presented a united front during a recent press conference, announcing unanimous agreement to centralize the flow of the Preliminary Electoral Results Transmission System (TREP). The idea would presumably be to make the transportation more transparent. However, the damage may already be done. In June, CNE councilors publicly showed disagreements regarding the awarding of TREP contracts.
This sparked suspicion of irregularities and alleged influence peddling from the ruling party. Libre-affiliated groups disrupted a July session of the CNE meant to finalize contract terms, which further eroded trust in the institution’s ability to manage free and transparent elections.
Despite these setbacks, presidential candidate Salvador Nasralla has declared that simply securing an election is a victory in and of itself. However, his attempt at quelling concerns cannot conceal the deeper issue: Honduras’s democratic institutions are unraveling.
Paving the Way to Stay in Power
Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (2002), sent out a warning. They noted that regimes could hold elections and maintain formal democratic institutions while in practice tilting the playing field heavily in favor of incumbents. In a 2020 update, they observed that this model is not only alive but has evolved. Honduras, they note, is among the countries where this hybrid form of governance persists despite strong historical ties to Western democracies, particularly the United States.
Levitsky and Way’s concept hinges on two factors: linkage—a country’s integration to the West—and leverage—its dependence on Western aid or diplomacy. Both once served as checks on authoritarian behavior. However, these authors acknowledge “The persistence of authoritarianism in high-linkage countries such as Honduras, Hungary, and Nicaragua shows how much Western democratizing pressure has weakened relative to the 1990s.”
This shift is especially alarming considering regional trends. Marta Lagos, director of the political-culture survey Latin Barometer, explains ideology has all but disappeared from Latin American elections. According to Lagos, voters are cornered into focusing on immediate concerns rather than long-term systems. In the case of Honduras, the 2024 Latin Barometer found satisfaction with democracy down to just 18 percent, two points lower than the previous year.
Levitsky and Way emphasize that elections still matter: “Citizens do not necessarily love democracy, but … they value the ability to vote out bad governments. This is why citizens across the world continue to take to the streets to demand or defend competitive elections.”
Honduras Still Has a Path Back
In a competitive authoritarian regime, manipulation can take many forms: institutional intervention, propaganda, vote-buying, or outright fraud. These tactics, however, are not immune to massive public rejection of the incumbent’s attempt to cling to power. The Libre Party’s actions—ranging from judicial overreach through the Public Prosecutor’s Office to alleged corruption and ties to drug trafficking—suggest a clear intent to stay in power beyond her mandate. This could shield her from prosecution and continue a broader regional socialist agenda. Castro has openly shown her ties to the São Paulo Forum and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)—both platforms aligned with anti-liberal governance models.
Levitsky and Way argue that maintaining at least the appearance of democracy becomes critical to authoritarians who still face some pushback from “strong democratic antibodies.” The authors advocate independent legal institutions, a strong private sector, active civil society, and organized opposition parties. These antibodies can block or delay full authoritarian capture. In addition to weak institutions, the Honduran private sector is also struggling. In 2024, Honduras received $993 million in foreign investment, the lowest of the last three years, and over 37,000 small businesses closed.
If the Castro administration, and potentially her successor, succeeds in weakening these pillars even more, Honduras risks becoming the next Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba—a nation where democratic restoration is not just difficult but almost unimaginable. Only an overwhelming opposition in the general election can stop the crusade to take over Honduras.
