On September 30, 2010, when I was eight years old, I remember being sent home early from school. Outside, panic spread and traffic was chaotic. Although I was too young to fully understand, the country was on the brink of a coup d’état. This turmoil occurred four years after a turbulent decade that had seen nine presidents and chaotic political instability.
The 30-S events, however, were a calculated self-coup by President Rafael Correa (2006–2017) to portray himself as a victim of the opposition, polarize the nation, and consolidate power. It was part of a fear-mongering strategy to justify institutional reforms and deepen hyperpresidentialism.
That is when an autocrat overrides other branches of government, and Correa formalized it through a national referendum months later. The 30-S events allowed him to position a false narrative of himself as a savior, shaping public opinion towards the reforms that were passed via referendum in May 2011.
In the study, “A Tale of a Failed Recovery: Ecuador’s Democratic Stagnation,” political-science professor Paolo Moncagatta and political analyst Mateo Pazmiño—from San Francisco University of Quito (USFQ)—examine the enduring consequences of Correa’s populist-authoritarian rule. Published in March 2025, in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Moncagatta and Pazmiño outline how the Correa administration dismantled checks and balances, centralized power in the executive, and eroded civil liberties.
The authors identify three factors that not only consolidated hyperpresidentialism under Correa but also continue to prevent Ecuador’s democracy from maturing: (1) the concentration of executive power, (2) censorship, and (3) a political culture rooted in loyalty over accountability. Although Correa left office in 2017, these conditions persist. Understanding them will be key to rebuilding the political system and preventing future leaders from repeating the same authoritarian pattern.
1. Entrenchment of Hyperpresidentialism
By rewriting the constitution in 2008, bypassing legislative processes, and packing other branches of government, the regime led by Correa’s Citizen Revolution party centralized executive power. Correa weakened the judiciary’s independence, diminished the legislature’s role, and led policymaking through presidential decrees.
Correa’s presidency damaged Ecuador’s standings in international democracy and rights rankings. The V-Dem Institute’s Rule of Law Index, for example, scored Ecuador 0.41 out of 1 in 2007 and 0.33 in 2016, compared to 0.51 in 2018, after Correa’s departure. In 2007, the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index gave Ecuador a score of 42 out of 100 points in civil liberties and 29 in political rights. In 2016, the scores declined to 33 and 24, respectively.
These indices, and others like them, affirm that Citizen Revolution policies like the 2013 Communications Law and judicial reforms, approved in the 2011 referendum, eroded civil liberties and checks on executive power. These scores also show, however, that the recovery has been slow and partial.
2. Erosion of Free Speech
In 2013, ruling-party legislators passed the Communication Law, AKA the gag rule, to purportedly democratize the media. However, the legislation provided the state the authority to control media content via the Superintendency of Information and Communication (SUPERCOM), significantly shaping public opinion. In 2018, then–President Lenín Moreno decreed the institution dissolved.
Finally closed in August 2019, SUPERCOM had broad authority to monitor, sanction, and regulate media outlets. It imposed fines, enforced mandatory corrections, and even suspended or shut down media outlets for publishing content deemed inaccurate, offensive, or “harmful to public order”—all defined in vague terms that left room for political abuse.
One high-profile example was Correa’s lawsuit against newspaper El Universo, where he sued the newspaper for defamation after it published a column critical of his handling of the 30-S events. The judge addressed the case in less than 24 hours, ruling in favor of Correa, underscoring judicial weaponization to silence criticism
3. Loyalty over Accountability
In June 2013, Correa issued Decree 16 to allegedly regulate nonprofits’ operation, but it actually allowed him to control and censor the civil society. Whenever the activities of a nonprofit dissented with the regime or threatened its public policies, the Correa administration claimed the organization had engaged in political activities—deviating from the original mission—or had failed to submit burdensome reports on time.
In December 2013, José Miguel Vivanco—Human Rights Watch’s executive director for the Americas—argued: “President Correa’s recent decree regulating civil society gave the government the power to shut down human rights and other groups that interfere with his agenda.”
That same month, the Correa administration forced the closure of the Pachamama foundation—which safeguards indigenous communities’ lands. Similarly, in 2015, the Citizen Revolution regime sought to close Fundamedios—which defends the right to freedom of expression—because they were allegedly spreading messages with political undertones. After international pressure from international organizations such as Human Rights Watch, the government dropped the case.
In 2017, digital outlet Plan V reported the number of nonprofits shut down during the Correa administration remains uncertain, given the lack of transparency. Only three of the 28 Ministries that handled nonprofits’ registration revealed they shut down 445 nonprofits. In 2017, Moreno halted civil-society persecution by withdrawing Decree 16.
Correa also dominated the national narrative through his weekly Sabatinas: Saturday broadcasts presented as spaces for public accountability. In practice, these programs served as platforms to justify political decisions, shape public opinion, and discredit opponents in front of a captive audience. By framing dissent as an attack on national stability, Correa blurred the lines between government transparency and propaganda, turning state media into a tool for political control.
An Uphill Journey Remains
Although some authoritarian measures were reversed after Correa’s departure in 2017, the structural damage persisted. Successor governments of Moreno and Guillermo Lasso failed to rebuild institutional strength and, lacking consistent legislative support, continued to rely on executive-centered governance. In May 2023, Lasso even invoked a constitutional provision to dissolve the National Assembly amid a governance crisis.
The legacy of hyperpresidentialism—manifested in politicized courts, weakened checks and balances, personality-dominated political parties, and disputed, volatile electoral outcomes—continues to shape Ecuador. Moncagatta and Pazmiño warn that without meaningful institutional reform and civic commitment, the country will struggle to develop.
If Ecuadorians want lasting change, we must start by understanding how we got here. The very conditions that enabled authoritarianism are still with us. Recognizing them is the first step to dismantling them. Democracy will not be rebuilt from the top down. It requires citizens willing to hold power to defend institutions, choose leaders who respect limits, and call into question policies that jeopardize the rule of law and fundamental liberties.
