In early May 2026, Salvadoran investigative outlet El Faro reported more persecution by Nayib Bukele’s government. Two partners of Trípode S.A., the media parent company, had their bank accounts and properties frozen.
This came after the outlet published investigations into alleged pacts between the government and criminal gangs. The International Journalists Federation warned the case represents escalation in the harassment of independent media in El Salvador.
The erosion of press freedom is only one symptom of a deeper problem taking place in El Salvador. Bukele’s security strategy has reduced violence significantly, at least in terms of reported data, and turned him into the most popular elected official in Latin America. At the same time, however, his model has normalized a permanent state of emergency, mass incarceration, attacks on civil society, and the concentration of power around a single political figure.
That trade-off is precisely why the Bukele model has become so attractive across the region. After decades of insecurity and institutional failure, many Latin Americans have started to see democratic limits as obstacles. Once exceptional powers get tested, however, they rarely remain limited to fighting organized crime. The risks of exporting that model across the region are already becoming visible in El Salvador itself.
1. One man pushes the button on security policy.
CID Gallup reported in March 2026 that Bukele holds 94 percent approval in El Salvador. His security policies enjoy overwhelming public support. This provides Bukele leeway to stay in office for more terms.
After the 2024 election, Bukele removed constitutional limits on reelection, securing the continuity of his political project. Nevertheless, legal reforms alone do not explain his permanence in power. Bukele built a strongman narrative around his presidency.
Many Salvadorans believe that gangs and violence would return if he left office. That fear ties directly to the prison system, which has become the government’s main political asset. Today, Salvadoran prisons hold nearly 90,000 people—more than one prisoner for every 50 Salvadorans. Justice and Public Security Minister Gustavo Villatoro has stated that inmates will “never return” to their communities, ruling out any form of rehabilitation.
A hotel owner in Santa Ana, El Salvador’s second-largest city, told Al Jazeera: “Even though the system is very strict, I do not agree that we should remove it now, because gang members will want to come back. If only 10 gang members walk freely in the streets, the problem begins again.”
Bukele has not allowed other leaders within his political movement to gain influence. Hence, the system allegedly depends on his continued presence in power. Meanwhile, thousands of detainees, some culprits and some innocent, remain in prison without a judicial sentence. Many face overcrowded conditions and severe restrictions on fundamental rights.
2. Authoritarianism turns into normalized repression.
The case denounced by members of El Faro in early May is just one example of the attacks against the media in El Salvador. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had already granted precautionary measures to El Faro journalists, and in 2023 the outlet moved its operations to Costa Rica. The government has targeted journalists with Pegasus spyware, money-laundering and tax-evasion accusations, and online harassment campaigns driven by progovernment actors. On face, this appears to be a flagrant and broad case of lawfare.
Under a permanent state of emergency since 2022, attacks against civil society have intensified. The pattern increasingly resembles the censorship model of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. In May 2025, Bukele’s congressional majority approved the Foreign Agents Law. The law imposes strict restrictions on organizations that receive international funding and gives the government broad powers to revoke legal status. Authorities also jailed prominent human-rights lawyer Ruth López under sealed judicial proceedings, reinforcing fears that emergency powers now extend well beyond criminal groups. Further, harm to innocents is going beyond sloppy mistakes, which are bound to occur with such a wide net, to include deliberately targeted dissidents.
Countries that now seek to replicate the Bukele model against organized crime—such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina—risk normalizing permanent states of emergency and expanding hardline policies beyond criminal groups. Ecuador already operates under continuously recurring states of emergency, and the government passed a law last year that expanded financial controls over civil-society organizations. This year, opposition parties and media outlets have already reported political pressure and retaliation.
3. State coercion, taxpayer funds elevate regime propaganda.
Throughout his presidency, Bukele has disregarded traditional media, even blocking journalists from presidential press conferences. Instead, he prefers to communicate directly through X and appear on shows hosted by YouTubers and podcasters with millions of followers. In a 2024 interview with Time magazine, Bukele argued that journalism “often functions as propaganda” and defended social media as a way to reach the public without going through the press filter.
The digital ecosystem surrounding Bukelismo, however, has turned into a propaganda machine. Mexican investigative outlet Animal Político reported in 2023 that 90 percent of the videos published by 16 YouTube channels dedicated almost entirely to progovernment content contained disinformation. These channels have accumulated billions of views.
Similarly, during COVID-19, the hashtag #BukeleDictador quickly lost traction to #QueBonitaDictadura (what a beautiful dictatorship). Researchers from Crisis Group then identified that accounts, which appeared to be bots, were boosting the latter.
As the traditional media have weakened, Bukele has created space for parallel propaganda ecosystems built on influencers, bots, and direct communication. In Ecuador, President Daniel Noboa is also prioritizing digital platforms, limiting access to certain media outlets, and using state advertising as a mechanism of pressure and survival for others.
The Bukele model is dangerous not only for its authoritarian tendencies but also for its attractiveness for replication across Latin America. To be fair, the region is struggling with seemingly unprecedented violence, while Salvadorans are enjoying a safer country now.
The problem is that governments eventually turn to authoritarian tools enabled by the permanent state of emergency against journalists, civil society, and opponents. Latin America has a long history of embracing strongmen during moments of crisis, and usually it discovers too late that dismantling democratic institutions is easier than rebuilding them.
