On May 31, Colombia held a presidential election that set up a runoff between right-wing outsider Abelardo De la Espriella (43.7 percent) and socialist Iván Cepeda (40.9 percent). De la Espriella’s popularity follows the Latin American trend of demand for order—a crackdown on organized crime and corruption—and a break from traditional politics.
Under President Gustavo Petro, the country has faced growing economic and security challenges. During the first two months of 2026, Colombia’s fiscal deficit exceeded 33.4 trillion pesos, equivalent to 1.7 percent of GDP—the highest level ever recorded for that period. At the same time, 368 companies shut down operations, a 160 percent increase compared to 2022. Kidnappings also rose by more than 110 percent in 2025, reaching their highest level in 15 years.
In such a scenario, one can understand why many Colombians want quick solutions and firm leadership. De la Espriella has successfully channeled that demand for order, growth, and effective governance. The question remains, however, whether his political project offers a sustainable path to a stronger Colombia. There is a risk that his populist and authoritarian rhetoric could weaken the institutions that protect liberty, stability, and long-term development.
Security sans Institutional Limits
De la Espriella has pledged to fight insecurity through a 90-day military intervention against armed groups and criminal organizations. However, recent experience in the region shows that extraordinary measures rarely remain temporary.
In El Salvador, Ecuador, and even further afield in Peru and Chile, states of emergency have evolved into long-lasting governing mechanisms. In El Salvador, despite officially reporting some of the lowest homicide rates in the region, the country continues to operate under an ongoing state of emergency.
Security is essential for prosperity. However, when governments continuously resort to exceptional or emergency tools, civil liberties and democratic oversight are undermined.
Good to Be King?
If De la Espriella wins the runoff, he will take office with minimal congressional support. His “National Salvation” campaign platform holds only four seats in Congress, while overt socialists of the Historic Pact and Liberal Party control one-third of the legislature. Eight additional parties hold congressional representation, creating a fragmented political environment where major reforms would typically require broad negotiations and coalition-building.
De la Espriella has repeatedly said he will not seek alliances with traditional political parties. Those statements increase the likelihood that he may rely on political pressure or the concentration of extraordinary powers in the executive branch to bypass legislative obstacles.
In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele came to power promising to defeat a discredited political class. Once in office, his legislative majority removed Constitutional Chamber magistrates and the attorney general, eliminating important institutional checks on executive authority. Years later, those same institutional changes facilitated a presidential reelection that El Salvador’s Constitution prohibited.
Negotiated reforms often move more slowly and produce imperfect outcomes. However, those institutional balances protect citizens from abuses of authority. When checks and balances disappear, the use of the force justified to fight criminals, defeat political opponents, or overcome legislative gridlock can eventually target civil society, media, and the judiciary.
De la Espriella Is Not an Outsider
During his campaign, De la Espriella has highlighted his financial independence and ability to fund his own political career. However, while he presents himself as an alternative to the traditional political establishment, his trajectory does not reveal a true outsider.
De la Espriella built his image as an attorney representing figures involved in controversial political and criminal scandals. Several of De la Espriella’s clients were linked to former paramilitary leaders and networks.
For six years, De la Espriella represented Alex Saab. While living between Colombia and Venezuela and now extradited to the United States, Saab is known as Nicolás Maduro’s alleged frontman on paper and one of the key operators of the Venezuelan regime. The candidate claims he cut ties once he learned of Saab’s relationship with Maduro, but that is difficult to believe. At best, it suggests a failure of due diligence. At worst, it raises questions about the type of actors De la Espriella was willing to work with as long as the relationship remained financially beneficial.
Colombian independent outlet La Silla Vacía reports De la Espriella has an estimated net worth of $5.2 million, with several of his companies maintaining negative equity positions. The investigation identified business relationships involving actors connected to Colombia’s oil and mining sectors, including Serafino Iácono and Federico Restrepo Solano. De la Espriella also appears to work with individuals convicted of promoting paramilitary structures.
While these relationships on their own do not constitute evidence of wrongdoing by the candidate, they raise questions about potential conflicts of interest. Those concerns become even more relevant given De la Espriella’s proposals to restart oil exploration, expand hydrocarbon production, and promote extractive industries.
De la Espriella has transformed his popularity, business connections, and personal brand into a political vehicle capable of channeling public frustration. Like other strong personalities across the region, he has turned himself into the embodiment of political renewal. What remains to be seen is whether this represents a genuine effort to deliver structural changes or a political vehicle for the power networks that have accompanied him throughout his career.
A Warning for Colombia
Popular frustration with the Petro administration has fueled demand for a confrontational leader who promises fast results on security and economic growth. However, the failure of a political project does not automatically make every alternative compatible with liberty, the rule of law, and long-term prosperity.
Colombia needs stronger growth, greater investment, and improved security. However, it also needs institutions capable of limiting power and preserving stable rules. A leader with a distinct, attractive personal brand is not the solution. The real solution, albeit less exciting and more difficult, is ensuring that democratic institutions and fundamental rights accompany the restoration of order.
