Guatemala’s Competition Authority Must Abide by Own Principles

Regulations Provide Public, Merit-Based Procedure for New Superintendent

Competition Authority SICOM
SICOM must ensure that its head appointment results from a genuinely competitive process. (Andrés Sebastián Díaz)

Lea en español.

On July 27, the board of directors of Guatemala’s Competition Authority (SICOM) accepted the irrevocable resignation of the first superintendent, Jorge Castillo. SICOM was created in 2024 to help the nation’s markets operate with clearer rules, fewer artificial barriers, and greater freedom of participation.

The early resignation occurred amid citizen disagreement regarding SICOM’s elevated salaries. The turn of events obliges the board to define the selection procedure for the next superintendent and to adjust the timetable through a formal board resolution. SICOM’s legitimacy depends on the way it investigates and makes decisions, but also on the way it selects its own authorities. As an institution dedicated to promoting competition, SICOM must ensure that its head appointment results from a genuinely competitive process.

The vacancy created by the departure of the first superintendent entails a critical decision for Guatemala. The country must choose between restricting the selection to the lists used during the founding stage or opening a new call for applications in which all professionals who meet the legal requirements may take part. That especially applies to those with master’s-level training in competition law and economics.

The Competition Law has already established the path forward. Its Article 115 resolved an initial need: to select the first superintendent from the slates drawn up to install the new institutional framework. It was an extraordinary formula for an initial stage. Article 50 of the Competition Law contains the rule intended for subsequent appointments and empowers the board to define the corresponding mechanism.

A secondary regulation gives effect to that power. Article 99 provides for a public call for (1) applications, (2) a credential review, (3) a grading table, (4) the possibility of correcting documentary deficiencies, (5) the selection of six finalists, and (6) a competitive examination. There is no need to start from scratch. The procedure was already designed with a public and merit-based orientation.

Keeping the competition for the post closed would unnecessarily narrow the pool of applicants. It could also convey the idea that having participated in the inaugural process created a preferential expectation regarding future vacancies. The law establishes no such privilege. The 2025 candidates may apply again and bring their experience to bear, but they must be measured against new professionals under the same conditions.

The openness of the selection call matters because the required profile is complex. The next superintendent must be a solid professional of strong character with knowledge of competition law and economics as well as of how businesses operate. He must also know how to manage a budget, lead teams, and withstand pressure. Narrowing the search in advance reduces the likelihood of finding the most suitable combination of knowledge, experience, independence, and character.

A competition policy and law must protect the competitive process, not turn the state into an adversary of the firms that grow and innovate. The Competition Authority’s legitimate aim is to reduce privileges, prevent artificially created barriers, and act when economic power is used to close markets in ways contrary to the logic of the market economy and the law. Applying that mandate with discernment requires an authority selected with rigor.

An open process offers practical advantages:

  1. Publicity makes it possible to review credentials and detect conflicts of interest.
  2. The grading table requires identifying relevant attributes before knowing the participants.
  3. The examination provides a common technical benchmark.
  4. Deliberation and reasoned votes facilitate citizen and judicial oversight.

In April, the president of the SICOM board favored an open call, leading to a recusal motion from within the board. That claim must be heard in accordance with due process. Stating that regulations provide for a public mechanism is not, in itself, equivalent to choosing a candidate or replacing the collegial vote. There is a difference between communicating the general rule and deciding how it will be applied to an extraordinary case.

A more cautious explanation could have stressed from the beginning that an open call was already contemplated, but that its concrete application remained subject to deliberation. Even so, a possible communication flaw does not justify heading back to a transitional formula or halting the institution indefinitely. The solution consists of resolving the challenges, approving the extraordinary rules that are needed, and preserving the essential components of the regulatory procedure.

Markets thrive when legal certainty exists and when institutions apply general rules. Consumers benefit from effective competition—serious firms from predictable conditions. The selection of the new superintendent offers SICOM the opportunity to apply internally the principles it must defend externally: open up participation, compare alternatives, and choose on the basis of merit. That would be a sign of institutional maturity and of commitment to an economy based on the principles of competition.


This article reflects the views of the author and not necessarily the views of the Impunity Observer.


Please subscribe to leave comments.

Scroll to Top