Four Ways to Rid Chile of Organized Crime

Illicit Activities Fill Vacuum Left by Absent Institutions

Chile Organized Crime

Chile's murder rate jumped from 4.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2018 to 6.3 in 2023. (Sebastián Díaz)

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Five years ago, Chile was ripe for establishing criminal activities and going unnoticed. Despite being a regional leader in economic development, institutional integrity, and security, Chile had yet to implement measures to combat transnational organized crime. This allowed members of the Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan mega-criminal gang, to infiltrate the country with human trafficking and money laundering. Raúl Arancibia, a prosecutor in northern Chile, confessed local officials had to search on Google to learn about the Tren de Aragua in December 2020. Two Peruvian women claimed the gang forced them to smuggle drugs into the country: “The ladies made us aware of what was happening.”

The 2019 strikes that paralyzed the country, the two failed attempts to pass a new constitution, and the surge in immigration created an environment even more conducive to organized crime. Chile experienced declining economic opportunities and weakening political institutions, and criminal networks swooped in.

This led to a rapid increase in reported criminal activities. The murder rate jumped from 4.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2018 to 6.3 in 2023. Between July 1 and July 15 of this year alone, Chile registered 43 homicides—an unthinkable number just a few years ago.

To counteract the expansion of organized crime, Chile needs to improve trust in its democratic institutions, revise its migration policy, encourage private investment and job creation, and lead regional efforts to combat organized crime. 

  • Restore Chile’s reputation as a stable liberal democracy.

Chile’s ranking on the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has decreased from 25th in 2019 to 33rd in 2023. The areas where Chile performs poorest are regulatory enforcement (0.63 out of one), civil justice (0.62), and criminal justice (0.55). The latter assesses the nation’s “mechanism to redress grievances and bring action against individuals for offenses against society.”

Catalina Uribe and Catalina Perdomo, program officers at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, argue: “fragile democratic institutions, low state capacity, and poor enforcement mechanisms increase the risk of organized crime presence.” The fight against organized crime requires judicial independence and equality before the law. Chilean officials should focus on enhancing governability, reducing political conflicts, and reinforcing liberal democracy, emphasizing checks and balances, political rights, and civil liberties. This would restore confidence in political institutions and officials, including the police, judges, and prosecutors—crucial actors in the criminal justice system.

According to the report “Institutional Confidence in Chile,” released by the think tank Public Studies Center (PSC) in December 2023, confidence in political institutions has declined over the last five years. The police and armed forces maintain relatively broad approval, with 52 percent and 48 percent of the population, respectively, expressing trust in them as of July 2024. This is promising for the application of combative measures against criminal groups.

However, just 18 percent trust the government, and a mere 8 percent trust the Congress, which could hinder the implementation of more comprehensive actions to prevent further criminal operations. The PSC notes: “The confidence in our institutions is a challenge that should be addressed by every Chilean sector by contributing to the enhancement of our democracy and economic growth.”

  • Streamline migration legislation to prevent human smuggling.

In December 2020, the Chilean Congress passed the Immigration and Alien Status Law, superseding a presidential decree issued by former dictator Augusto Pinochet. The goal was to enhance migration controls, particularly to halt the noticeable rise in Venezuelan and Haitian migrant populations.

As of December 2020, Chile’s National Statistics Institute estimated the presence of 455,494 Venezuelans and 185,865 Haitians in the country. Moreover, between 2017 and 2021, the migrant population in Chile doubled. Around 1.5 million migrants now live in Chile, with an estimated 150,000 entering without legal authorization or overstayed their permitted period.

However, the legislation did not deliver the expected results. The migration crisis deepened to the point that Chile militarized its northern border in February 2023. Uncertainty and increased red tape related to migration have left migrants more vulnerable and falling between the cracks. This makes them easy targets for criminal groups—particularly the Tren de Aragua—in their human trafficking operations (coyoterismo).

By mid-2023, Chilean President Gabriel Boric issued an amnesty-focused migration policy to address the problem. For Luis Thayer, the National Migration Service’s director, this policy lacked an effective mechanism to formalize the migrant status. Regardless, a blanket amnesty would not fix the informality or deport criminal elements. Clearer procedures for migration processing and grounds for swift deportation to origin countries, while attracting investment and entrepreneurship, are essential for creating win-win economic opportunities.

  • Return to free markets and encourage investment.

In 2013, Chile reached its highest score in the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index, with 79 points out of 100. By 2024, its score had declined to 71.4, with its lowest categories being investment freedom (60) and fiscal health (66). 

Chile has historically been an attractive destination for migrants due to its strong economy. However, socialist President Michelle Bachelet’s reforms, the 2019 violent riots, and the 2020 global economic slowdown halted the proliferation of economic opportunities in Chile. With its longstanding, solid reputation among investors and businesses, restoring legal certainty and issuing legal perks could swiftly generate private-sector endeavors and jobs.

  • Lead international cooperation.

The violence currently affecting Chile demonstrates that criminal groups are trying to break the will of officials. So long as the Tren de Aragua and other gangs have yet to significantly co-opt the Chilean government or judiciary, Chile has an advantage in combating criminal groups and being a leader in this domain.

A successful effort requires regional coordination. As Walter Kemp of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime asserts, “Criminals have organized globally while police remain largely focused on national jurisdictions or bilateral cooperation.”

A regional strategic approach to fighting transnational organized crime would enable Latin American nations to share intelligence data and implement synchronized policies on related issues, such as migration and security. By working together and streamlining their operations, Latin American countries could limit criminals’ opportunities to profit from illicit activities.

Paz Gómez

Paz Gómez is the Econ Americas research director and a widely published economic commentator. Based in Quito, she leads the firm’s office in Ecuador. She holds an MS in digital currency and blockchain from the University of Nicosia, Cyprus, and a BA in international relations and political science from San Francisco University of Quito. She is a cofounder and the academic coordinator of Libre Razón, a classical-liberal think tank in Quito, Ecuador. Follow @mpazgomezm.

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